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Distributed denial-of-service (DoS) attacks present a great threat to the Internet, and
existing security mechanisms cannot detect or stop them successfully. The problem lies
in the distributed nature of attacks, which engages the power of a vast number of
coordinated hosts. To mitigate the impacts of DDoS attacks, it is important to develop
such defenses system thatcanbothdetect andreact against ongoing attacks. The attacks
ideally should be stopped as close to the sources as possible, saving network resources
andreducing congestion. The DDoS defense system that is deployed at the source-end
should prevent the machines at associated network from participating in DDoS attacks.
The primary objective of this project, which is developing a DDoS defense system, is to
provide good service to a victim's legitimate clients during the attack, thus canceling
the denial-of-service effect. The scope of study will coverthe aspectof how the attack
detection algorithms work and identify the attack traffic, hence develop appropriate
attack responses. As a source-end defense against DDoS attacks, the attack flows can be
stopped before they enter the Internet core and before they aggregate with other attack flows.
The methodology chosen for this project is the combination of sequential and iterative
approaches of the software development process, which comprises of six main phases,
which are initial planning phase, requirement definition phase, system design phase,
coding and testing phase, implementation phase, and lastly maintenance and support
phase. The system used a source router approach, in which the source router serves as a
gateway between the source network containing some of the attack nodes and the rest of the
Internet, to detectand limitDDoS streams long before they reach the target. This will be
covered in the Findings section of the report. TheDiscussion section willbe focus more on the
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1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY
1.1.1 Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are particular interest and concern to the Internet
community because they seek to render target system inoperable and/or target networks
inaccessible. 'Traditional5 DoS attacks, however, typically generate a large amount of
traffic from a given host or subnet and it is possible for a site to detect such an attack in
progress and defends themselves. Distributed denials of service (DDoS) attacks are a
much more nefarious extension of DoS attacks because they are designed as a
coordinated attack from many sources simultaneously against one or more targets.
DoS attacks under a number of guises have been around for decades, Distributed DoS
attacks are much newer, first being seen in late June and early July of 1999. The first
well-documented DDoS attack appears to have occurred in August 1999, when a DDoS
tool called Trinoo was deployed in at least 227 systems, of which at least 114 were on
Internet, to flood a single University of Minnesota computer; this system was knocked
off the air for more than two days.
To describe and understand DDoS attacks, it is important to understand the terminology
that is used to describe the attacks. DDoS attacks always involve a number of systems.
A typical DDoS attack scenario might follow roughly the following steps:
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1. An intruder finds one or more systems on the Internet that canbe compromised
and exploited (see figure below). This is generally accomplished using a stolen
account on a system with a large number of users and/or inattentive
administrators, preferably with a high-bandwidth connection to the Internet
(many suchsystems canbe found on college anduniversity campuses).
Figure 1.1: An intruder finds systemon Internetthan can be compromised.
2. The compromised system is loaded with any number of hacking and cracking
tools such as scanners, exploit tools, operating system detectors, root kits, and
DoS/DDoS programs. This system becomes the DDoS master. The master
software allows it to find a number of other systems that can themselves be
compromised and exploited. The attacker scans large ranges of IP network
address blocks to find systems running services known to have security
vulnerabilities. This initial mass-intrusion phase employs automated tools to
remotely compromise several hundred to several thousand hosts, and installs
DDoS agentson those systems. The automated tools to perform this compromise
is not part of the DDoS toolkit but is exchanged within groups of criminal
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hackers. These compromised systems are the initial victims of the DDoS attack.
These subsequently exploited systems will be loaded with the DDoS daemons
that carry out the actual attack (see figure below).
DDoS masterls a compromised
system that can manage a
number of other compromised
systems with DDoS daemon
software
Figure 1.2: The exploited systems are loaded withthe DDoS daemon.
3. The intruder maintains a list of ownedsystems, the compromised systems with
the DDoS daemon. The actual denial of service attack phase occurs when the
attacker runs a program at the master systemthat communicates with the DDoS
daemons to launch the attack. Here is where the intended DDoS victim comes
into the scenario (see next figure).
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The daemons attack the
victim upon command from
the muster
Victim sm flooded with
packets from multiple
attackers
Figure 1.3: The victim site flooded with packets from multiple attackers.
Communication between the master and daemons can be obscured so that it becomes
difficult to locate the master computer. Although some evidence may exist on one or
more machines in the DDoS network regarding the location of the master, the daemons
are normally automated so that it isn't necessary for an ongoing dialogue to take place
between the master and the rest of the DDoS network. In fact, techniques are typically
employed to deliberately camouflage the identity and location of the master within the
DDoS network. These techniques make it difficult to analyze an attack while in
progress and also to block attacking traffic and trace it back to its source.
To align those terms and the terms used by the hacker literature as well as early
descriptions, we find the following synonyms:
• Intruder: Also called the attacker or client
• Master: Also called the handler
• Daemon: Also called an agent, beast (broadcast) program, or zombie
• Victim: Always the victim
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In addition, there are several features of DDoS attacks that severely challenge the
design of successful defenses:
• Use of IP source spoofing.
Attackers frequently use source address spoofingduring the attack — they fake
information in the IP source address field in attack packet headers. One benefit
attackers receive from IP spoofing is that it is extremely difficult to trace the
agent machines. This, in turn, brings several dire consequences. Since agent
machines run a very low risk of being traced, information stored on them (i.e.,
access logs) cannot help to locate the attacker himself. This greatly encourages
DDoS incidents. Furthermore, hiding the address of agent machines enables the
attacker to reuse them for future attacks. Last, as attack packets carry a wide
variety of addresses, they appear as if they come from many disparate sources;
this defeats fair-sharing techniques that are a straightforward solution to
resource overloading problems.
* Large number of agent machines.
Even if traceback could be successfully performed in the face of IP spoofing, it
is difficult to say what actions could be taken against hundreds or thousands of
agent machines. Such a large number prevents any but crude automated
responses aimed at stopping attack flows close to the sources.
* Similarity of attack to legitimate traffic.
Any type of traffic can be used to perform a successful denial-of-service attack.
Some traffic types require a higher attack volume for success than others, and
attack packets of different types and contents target different resources.
However, if the goal is simply to cripple the victim's operation, it can be met by
sending sufficiently large volumes of any traffic and clogging the victim's
network. Attackers tend to generate legitimate-like packets to perform the
attack, obscuring the malicious flow within legitimate traffic. Since malicious
packets do not standout from legitimate ones, it is impossible to sieve legitimate
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from attack traffic basedpurely on examination of individual packets. A defense
system must keep a volume of statistical data in order to extract transaction
semantics from packet flows and thus differentiate some legitimate traffic (e.g.
belonging to lengthy well-behavedtransactions) from the attack traffic.
1.1.2 DDoS Defense
The seriousness of the DDoS problem and the increased frequency, sophistication and
strength of attacks has led to the advent of numerous defense mechanisms. Yet,
although it has been several years since the first distributed attacks were perpetrated,
and many solutions have been developed since then, the problem is hardly dented, let
alone solved.
The truth is that a site cannot defend itself from DDoS attacks alone. DDoS attacks
depend upon the "community" of the Internet and defenses, therefore, depend upon the
Internet community acting like a community with a common interest. And defending
against attack includesensuring that our own sites are not the source of attacks and our
own networks do not forward attacks. The following will discuss some methods have
been practiced by general users and professional experts that will help prevent the
spread of DDoS attacks, by limiting the distribution of the tools and/or limiting the
propagation ofthe offending "attack" packets
1.1.2.1 User and System Administrator Actions
Despite the best intentions and even the bestdistributed system management tools, the
fact is that most computers today are largely managed by the local user. That means, in
essence, that the local system has no security protections. However, whether the local
host computer is a secretary's desktop system or the Web server for a company, there
areprocedures thatcan and should be taken to minimize the potential thatan individual
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system will be compromised and itself attacked or used as a stepping-stone to attack
others:
1. Keep abreast of the security vulnerabilities for all of the site's hardware,
operating systems, and application and other software. This sounds like a
Herculean task but it is essential to safeguarding the network. Apply patches and
updates as soon as possible. Standardize on certain hardware, operating systems,
and software where feasible to help manage the problem.
2. Consider using some form of "personal" firewall software to help detect an
attack at particular systems.
3. Monitor the system periodically to test for known operating system
vulnerabilities. Also periodically check to see what TCP/UDP ports are in use
using the netstat -a command; every open port should be associated with a
known application. All unused applications should be turned off.
4. Regularly monitor the system logs and look for suspicious activity.
5. The use of available tools to periodically audit the systems, particularly servers,
to ensure that there have been no unauthorized/unknown changes to the file
system, registry, user account database, etc.
6. Avoid downloading software from unknown, untrusted sites. If possible, know
the author of the code. Even better is to download source code, review it (where
feasible), and compile it on your system, if possible, rather than downloading
binaries or executables.
7. Follow CERT, SANS, and TruSecure (ICSA) best practices procedures.
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1.1.2.2 Local Network Actions
Even if a user locks down their system so that no vulnerability has gone unpatched and
no exposure unprotected, the network itself (including the user community) can still be
at risk. There are a number of procedures that local network managers and network
adrmnistratorscan take to protect all of their own users as well as the rest of the Internet
commumty:
1. Every network connected to the Internet should perform egress address filtering
at the router. Egressfiltering means that the router should examine the IP Source
Address field of every outgoing packet to the Internet to be sure that the
NETJD matches the NETJD of the network. The user's firewall has
historically been used to protect the user from attacks from the outside world.
But those attacks come from somewhere so sites should also use the firewall to
protect the outside world.
2. Networks should block incoming packets addressed to the broadcast address (the
all-ones HOSTJD). There is no legitimate reason that an external network
device should be sending a broadcast message to every host on your network.
3. To prevent the site from being used as a broadcast amplification point, turn off
the Directed Broadcast capability at the router unless it is absolutely essential.
4. RFC 1918 defines a set of private IP addresses that are not to be routed on the







One Class A address
16 Class B addresses
256 Class C addresses
Table 1.1: Non routable IP addresses
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5. In addition, there are a number of reserved IP addresses that are never assigned
to "public" networks, including:




224.0.0.0/4 Class D Multicast address range
240.0.0.0/5 Class E Experimental address range
248.0.0.0/5 Unallocated
255.255.255.255/32 Broadcast
Table 1.2: Reserved IP addresses
6. IP address spoofing is commonly employed by attackers and they commonly use
one of the RFC 1918 private addresses or one of the other reserved addresses.
Any packet that contains an RFC 1918 or reserved IP address in the IP Source
Address or Destination Address field should be immediately discarded by the
firewall and not ever sent to the Internet.
7. All unused application ports at the firewall should be blocked, particularly such
portsas IRC (6665-6669/tcp) and thoseknown to be associated with DDoS tools.
8. Use some form of intrusion detection system (IDS) to protect the network.
Considering providing every system with "personal" firewall software to help
detect an attack at individual systems; this is particularly potentially useful at
sites (suchas colleges) that have a largenumber of systems in front of a firewall
(it is no coincidence that so many daemons reside on college and university
computers that have been "owned").
9. Network activity should be regularly monitored so that aberrations in traffic
flow can be quickly detected.
-9-
10.Educate the users about things to watch for on their systems and how to report
any irregularity that might indicate that someone or something has tampered
with their system. Educate help desk and technical support to assist those users
who make such reports. Have an intelligence gathering system within your
organization so that such reports are centrally known so that trends can be
spotted and responses devised.
11. Follow CERT, SANS, and TruSecure (ICSA) best practices procedures.
1.1.2.3 ISP Actions
The Internet Service Providers (ISPs) offer the last hope in defeating the spread of a
DDoS attack. While the ISP cannot take responsibility for locking down every
customer's host systems, the ISPs have - and should accept ~ the responsibility to
ensure that their network does not carry packets that contain obviously "bad" packets.
Some ofthe procedures taken by ISPs include:
1. As mentioned above, IP address spoofing is commonly employed by attackers
using one of the RFC 1918 private addresses or one of the other reserved
addresses. Amazingly, many ISPs will route these packets. Indeed, there is no
entry in their routing table telling them where to send the packets; they merely
forward them to a default upstream ISP. Any packet that contains any RFC 1918
or reserved IP address in the IP Source Address or Destination Address field
should be immediately discarded.
2. Perform ingress (and egress) address filtering. Ingressfiltering means that they
should examine every incoming packet to their network from a customer's site
and examine the IP Source Address field to be sure that the NET_ID matches
the NET_ID assigned to that customer. This will require additional
configuration at the router and may even result is slight performance
degradation but the tradeoff is certainly well worth the effort. The ISPs should
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also perform egress filtering to check their outbound packets to upstream and
peer ISPs.
3. IP directed broadcasts should be disabled.
4. Educate customers about security and work with them to help protect
themselves.
Most of the ISP communities take at least some of these steps. Users should insist that
their ISPsprovide at least these protections and should not do business with those who
don't, in addition, the TruSecure (formerly ICSA) ISP Security (ISPSec) community is a
good source of information for ISPs.
1.1.2.4 Others DDoS Defense Tools
Responses to DDoS attacks are not limited to the defensive steps listed above. Indeed,
proactive responses to the preventionand detection ofDDoS attacks is an active area of
research. Additionally, there are numerous approaches to DDoS defense and network
security in general. Thus, in the following sections provided detailed descriptions of
related DDoS defense approaches, which are consisting of victim-end defenses, source-
end defenses, and distributed defenses. As depicted on Figure 1.4, each of the involved



















Figure 1.4: Point of Defense
• Victim-End Defenses
Historically, the majority of DDoS defense systems have been designed for victim-end
deployment. This is understandable since the victim suffers the largest damage from a
DDoS attack and is therefore motivated to invest in a defense system. A victim-end
DDoS defense system facilitates easy detection because it can closely observe the
victim, model its behavior and notice any anomalies.
However, the range of response is limited. The defense system is on the path of the full-
force attack, and may be overwhelmed by a large traffic volume. The point of failure is
then simply moved from the target to the DDoS defense system. Alternately, the
attacker may send enough traffic to overwhelm the victim's network connection in front
of the defense system. The point of DDoS is then beyond the defense system's scope.
Theotherconsequence of a largetraffic volume is the limited amount of processing and
storage that defense system can commit to. The differentiation of legitimate streams
from attack streams is complex at this point, since they have been heavily aggregated by
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the time they reach the victim network. To perform sophisticated traffic profiling a
system needs a large amount of storage and computational power to store and examine
statistics on each stream. In the presence of IP spoofing, this is infeasible as each packet
will appear to come from a different source. Poor traffic separation, in turn, leads to
large collateral damage during a response.
• Intermediate-Network Defenses
The danger of a DDoS attack on network resources that is still present in victim-end
defense was addressed by moving the defense further upstream, into the intermediate
network. An intermediate-network defense system, usually installed at a core router,
detects the attack through anomalies observed at this router. As core routers handle
large-volume, highly aggregated traffic, they are likely to overlook all but large-scale
attacks. Victim resources are frequently severely depletedby attacksthat look like small
glitches in the busy buffer of a core router. Detectedattacks can be quickly suppressed,
thanks to abundant network resources. However, response is likely to inflict collateral
damage as core routers can only accommodate simple rate-limiting requests and cannot
dedicate memory or processor cycles to traffic profiling.
• Source-End Defenses
As DDoS defense is pushed further from the victim to the source, detection capability
diminishes. A source-end defense system can no longer easily observe the effect of
incoming traffic on the victim. Further, as it may monitor only a small portion of the
attack, the defense system has difficulties in detecting anomalies. On the other hand,
response effectiveness increases with proximity to the sources. A small attack volume
enables an effective response as it is unlikely to overwhelm the defense system. The




Distributed systems for DDoS defense combine actions of victim-end, source-end and
sometimes of intermediate-network defense systems. Victim-end defenses detect the
attack and deliver the alert to other participants, who then cooperate to suppress attack
streams. The goal is to install responses as close to the sources as possible, thus
nuiiirnizing collateral damage.
Distributed defenses are likely to be the proper solution for handling the DDoS threat.
However, they are infrastructural solutions—they span multiple networks and
administrative domains and represent major undertakings of many Internet participants.
Such systems are difficult to deploy and maintain. Further, the required cooperation of
defenses is hard to achieve due to distributed Internet management and strictly
autonomous operation of administrative domains. Securing and authenticating the
communication channels also incurs a high cost ifthe number ofparticipants is large.
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Distributed denial-of-service attacks present a great threat to the Internet, and existing
security mechanisms cannot detect or stop them successfully. The problem lies in the
distributed nature of attacks, which engages the power of a vast number of coordinated
hosts. The response to the attack needs to be distributed also, but cooperation between
administrative domains is hard to achieve, and security and authentication of
participants incur a very high cost.
In the absence of effective defense mechanisms, the DDoS effect lasts for the entire
durationof the attack (i.e., as long as key resourcesare being tied with malicioustraffic),
and vanishes quickly once the attack is aborted. Since machine resources are usually
shared among many applications, the DDoS effect inflicts significant damage, not only
on client transactions with the victim, but on the victim's total operation. The victim
experiences a significant slowdown in all applications sharing thetargeted resource, and
frequently also connectivity disruption.
In the DDoS attacks, the attacking packets come from tens or hundreds of addresses
rather than just one, as in a 'traditional' DoS attacks. Any DoS defense system that is
based upon monitoring the volume of packets coming from a single address or single
network will then fail since the attacks come from all over. Rather than receiving, for
example, a thousands gigantic Pingsper second from an attacking site, the victim might
receiveone Ping per secondfrom 1000attacking sites.
In addition, the cooperation of distributed sources makes DDoS attacks hard to combat
or trace back. Any defense against these attacks must address their distributed nature to
be successful. Several DDoS defense systems have been proposed that deploy
cooperation between intermediate routers to combat the attacks. These routers are
augmented to monitor traffic and grant requests for rate-limiting of the systems they
deliver to their peers. While these approaches seem promising, they require the
cooperation of every router from the source to the destination host for response
-15-
propagation. Since the Internet is not under any single administrative control, global
deployment of such mechanisms is hard to enforce. Also, cooperation between routers
requires strongly secured andauthenticated communication, which incurs highcost.
Since there are many attack variations and many dimensions in which attacks can still
evolve while preserving the ability to inflict damage on the victim, this feature makes it
very challenging to design successful defenses systems. Due to attack variety, defense
system must maintain a volume of statistical data in order to detect attacks and sieve
legitimate from attack traffic. This, however, incurs high operation cost. On the other
hand, attackers can easily bypass or trick defenses with slight modifications to their
attacks. Any such modifications require added complexity in defense mechanisms (in
order to handle the new attack class), thus skyrocketingthe cost.
1.3 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF STUDY
Theprimary objective of this project, which is developing a DDoS defense system, is to
provide good service to a victim's legitimate clients during the attack, thus canceling
the denial-of-service effect. Ideally, clients should perceive little or no service
degradation while the attack is ongoing. The secondary objective is that to alleviate the
effect of the attack on the victim so that its resources can be dedicated to legitimate
clients or preserved.
The scope of study will cover the aspect of how the attack detection algorithms work
and identify the attack traffic, hence develop appropriate attach responses. In this
project, it will be focusing on a specified defense approach, with specified attack
responses, as well as a specifiedpoints ofdefensewill be deployedas explainedbelow:
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• Defense Approach
This project will be focusing in Responsive Approaches to detect the occurrence of
the attack and respond to it. In order to be successful, response approaches must
meet following requirement:
L Accurate detection
The system should be able to detect all attacks that inflict damage at the
victim.
2. Effective response
The system must stop the attack flows, regardless of their volume or
distribution. Alternately, in the case of response by agent identification,
the system must be able to accurately identify the majority of attack
machines regardless of their distribution. This identification must be
prompt so that the action can be taken while the attack is on-going.
Ideally, identification responses should identify not only the agent
machines, but also the master and the attacker machines.
3. Selective response
The system must differentiate between legitimate and attack packets, and
ensure good service to legitimate traffic during the attack. Collateral
damage due to the response must be lower than the damage suffered by
legitimate clients in the absence of response. This requirement does not
pertain to agent identification approaches.
• Attack Responses
There are two categories ofattack responses, which are destination filtering (for
attack victims) and source filtering (for attack sources). However, since this
project will be kind of source-end base defense system, therefore the attack
response will be the source filtering. Defenses in this category monitor the
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network traffic sent from some source networks, and mitigate the impacts of
ongoing attacktraffic originating from thesesources.
• Points of Defense
A DDoSdefense system can either be deployedas an autonomous (singlepoint)
system or as a distributed system. Autonomous systems consist of a single
defense node that observers the attack and applies the response. Distributed
systems consist of multiple defense nodes (frequently with same functionality)
that are deployed at various locations and organized into a network. In as
autonomous defense, a DDoS attack streams originate from distributed attack
machines are forwarded by core routers and converge at the victim network or
some nearby core router. The process is observed according to the interaction of
three types of network: source networks that unwittingly host attack machines,
several intermediate networks that forward attack traffic to the victim, and the
victim networks that host the target. For this particular project, it will be
focusing on the source network for autonomous based system.
Source-End Defense: Placing DDoS defense close to the sources of the
attack has many advantages over placing it further downstream. The attack
flows can be stopped before they enter the Internet core and before they
aggregate with other attack flows, and achieve the power to create network
congestion and exhaust resources of the victim and intermediate routers. Being
close to the sources can facilitate easier traceback and investigation of the
attack. Due to the low degree of flow aggregation, more complex detection
strategies can be deployed to achieve higher accuracy. Also, routers closer to
the sources are likely to relay less traffic than core routers and can dedicate
more of their resources to DDoS defense at a lower performance impact.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY
We've already familiar with denial-of-service (DoS) attacks for few decades, however,
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) is new. The main difference between DoS and
DDoS attacks is in scale - DoS attacks use one attack machine (to generate malicious
traffic) while DDoS attacks use large numbers of attack machines [1]. The scale
difference also invokes differences in operation modes.
The large number of attack machines allows DDoS attackers certain recklessness,
means that they frequently trade sophistication for brute force, using simple attack
strategies and packet contents to overload victim resources. The lack of effective
defense mechanisms, even for simple attacks, offers no motivation for attackers to
design more sophisticated ones. Once defenses successfully counter one attack class
(e.g., like ingress filtering has countered random IP source spoofing), attackers quickly
deployed slight modifications in their attacks to bypass defensive actions [2]. However,
any such modifications require added complexity in defense mechanisms in order to
handle the new attack class.
This leads many researchers to come with new defense mechanisms, including source
router approach. Placing the DDoS defense close to the sources of the attack has many
advantages over placing it further downstream [3]. The attack flows can be stopped
before they enter the Internet core and before they aggregate with other attack flows,
and achieve the power to create network congestion and exhaust resources of the victim
and intermediate routers. For example, the D-DWARD [4] system is installed at the
source router that serves as a gateway between deploying network (source network) and
the rest of the Internet.
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2.1 ATTACKER GOALS
The goal of a DDoS attack is to inflict damage on the victim. Frequently the ulterior
motives are personal reasons (a significant number of DDoS attacks are perpetrated
against home computers, presumably for purposes of revenge), or prestige (successful
attacks onpopular Web servers gain the respect of thehacker community). However, it
is not unlikely that some DDoS attacks are performed for material gain (damaging
competitor's resources, such as a case of Linux fans attacking SCO [5] because of its
lawsuit against IBM) or for political reasons (a country at war could perpetrate attacks
against its enemy's critical resources, potentially enlisting a significant portion of the
entire country's computing power for this action). In some cases, the true victim of the
attack might not be the actual target of the attack packets, but others who rely on the
target'scorrect operation. Forexample, in September 2002 there wasan onset of attacks
that overloaded the Internet infrastructure rather than targeting specific victims [6].
It also frequently happens that a DDoS attackis perpetrated accidentally, as a byproduct
of another malicious activity, such as worm spread [7]. Inefficient worm-spreading
strategies create massive traffic that congests the Internet and creates a denial-of-service
effect to numerous clients.
While ordinary home users are less likely to becomevictimsofDDoSattacks than large
corporate networks, no one is free from the DDoS threat. The next attack may target
AOL servers, denying service to many home users, or the next worm may congest the
Internet so severely that no one can receive service. DDoS is an Internet-wide problem
and all parties should cooperate to find a suitable solution.
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2.2 DDOS ATTACKS TOOLS
Distributed denial-of-service attacks exploit different strategies to exhaust the
resources of the victim. Some protocol implementations have bugs that allow a few
malformed packets to severely degrade server or network performance. The victim
can frequently prevent these attacks by implementing various patches to fix the
vulnerability, or by filtering malformed packets. On the otherhand, DDoS attacks can
leverage the power of many distributed machines to make a massive number of
legitimate requests for a service from a single host. Since these requests are
legitimate, the victim cannot refuse to service them, norcan it recognize them as partof
the attack until its resources are exhausted.
Attackers follow trends in the network security field and adjust their attacks to
defeat current defense mechanisms. Spoofing of source addresses is used to avoid
traceback and decoy packets and encryption are used to combat signature-based
detection. The following is a quick overview of the several well-known DDoS attack
tools in order to illustrate the variety ofmechanisms deployed.
Trinoo [8] is a simple tool usedto launch coordinated UDP flood attacks against one or
many IP addresses. The attack uses constant-size UDP packets to target random ports
on the victim machine. The master uses UDP or TCP to communicate with the slaves.
This channel can be encrypted and password protectedas well. Trinoo does not spoof
sourceaddresses althoughit can easily be extendedto includethis capability.
Tribe Flood Network (TFN) [9] can generate UDP and ICMP echo request
floods, TCP SYN floods and ICMP directed broadcast (e.g. Smurf). It can spoof
source IP addresses and also randomize the target ports. Communication between
masters and agents occurs exclusively through ICMP_ECHO_REPLYpackets.
Stacheldraht [10] combines features of Trinoo (master/agent architecture) with
those of the original TFN (ICMP/TCP/UDP flood and "Smurf* style attacks). It adds
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encryption to the communication channels between the attacker and Stacheldraht
masters. Communication is performed through TCP and ICMP packets. It allows
automated update of the agents using rep and a stolen account at some site as a cache.
New program versions will have more features and different signatures to avoid
detection.
TFN2K [11] is the variant of TFN that includes features designed specifically to make
TFN2K traffic difficult to recognize and filter. Targets are attacked via UDP, TCP
SYN, ICMP_ECHO flood or Smurf attack, and theattack type can bevaried during the
attack. Commands are sent from the master to the agent via TCP, UDP, ICMP, or all
three at random. Thecommand packets maybe interspersed withany number of decoy
packets sent to random IP addresses to avoid detection. In networks that employ
ingress filtering as, TFN2K can forge packets that appear to come from neighboring
machines. All communication between masters and agents is encrypted and base-64
encoded.
The mstream [12] tool uses spoofed TCP packets with the ACK flag set to attack the
target. Communication is not encrypted and is performed through TCP and UDP
packets. Access to the master is password protected. This program has a feature not
found in other DDoS tools. It informs all connected users ofaccess, successful or not, to
the handlers) by competing parties.
Shaft [13] uses TCP, ICMP or UDP flood to perform the attack and it can deploy all
three styles simultaneously. UDP is used for communication between masters and
agents and messages are not encrypted. Shaft randomizes the source IP address and the
source port in packets. The size of packets remains fixed during the attack. A new
feature is the ability to switchthe master's IP address andport during the attack.
The Code Red [14] worm is self-propagating malicious code that exploits a known
vulnerability in Microsoft IIS servers for propagation. It achieves synchronized attack
by preprogramming the onset and abort time of the attack, attack method and target
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addresses (i.e. no master/agent architecture is involved). In addition to sophisticated
attack tools, attackers also use a set of automated scripts for self-propagation of
malicious code and different techniques to mask the code at the sourcemachine.
2.3 DDOS DEFENSE TOOLS
Much of the work related to DDoS defense has been carried on in the area of
intrusion detection. Intrusion detection systems detect DDoS attacks either by
using the database of known signatures or by recognizing anomalies in system
behavior. One might argue that it suffices to take a well-developed network-based
intrusion detection system and deploy it on the source side, reversing its functions to
examine outgoing traffic. However, the attackappears different at the source and at the
target network. At the target network all DDoS flows converge and affect the system
greatly so that detection is inevitable; at the source end those flows are still dispersed
and can appear as a set of perfectly valid transactions. It is usually the sheer amount of
these transactions that saturates the target network.
Several popular network monitors perform mostly signature-based detection with
some limited statistical processing such as CISCO'S NetRanger, Network Intrusion
Detector, SeeureNet PRO [15], RealSecure [16], etc. Most of these systems do not
take automated action to stop the attack, but just raise an alert to the system
administrator.
In [17] an on-off control approach is proposed to fight DDoS attacks in a target
network. In control theoretical approach, a router detects that it is the target of a DDoS
attack by monitoring its buffer queue size. Once the queue size grows over a specified
threshold, the router reacts by switching to a different mode of operation and throttling
incoming traffic. Only packets belonging to certain type of traffic identified as
problematic are dropped. When the queue size is reduced, throttling is stopped. This
approach is similar to the RED congestion control mechanism [18]. Its application to
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the intrusion detection domain could efficiently protect the target of the attack
from overflowing its buffers by early detection of DDoS attack, while at the same
time not completely cutting off the traffic from the source network. However, its
application at the source network ofa DDoS attack would not be so effective, since the
originating network does not experience sufficiently high traffic loads to trigger the
response. It should also be noted that high traffic at a source network cannot be
regarded as reliable sign of DDoS attack - it could be an excess amount of legal
traffic that the destination network can easily handle.
Fewresearches [19] haverecognized that the analysis of TCP/IP packetstreams through
the network could be beneficial to fighting intrusion attacks. It combines a signature
based approach to IDS with statistical analysis for anomaly detection. EMERALD has
many similarities with our system in that it performs statistical analysis of network
traffic and is able to take an automated response when the system intrusions are
detected. However, its statistical subsystem would have to be substantially modified to
detect anomalies in two-way traffic.
CISCO routers have built-in features such as debug logging and IP accounting
that can be used for characterizing and tracing common attacks [20]. An access list
can be configured to log many network events, e.g. to count packets received and
categorize them by type, and to log sources of packets that are of special interest.
This feature only gathers statistical data and offers no automated analysis or response.
Several researches have been proposed to augment routers with the ability to detect
and control flows that create congestion and that are frequently part of DDoS attack.
Flows are detected by monitoring the dropped packets in the router queue and
identifying high-bandwidth aggregates that are responsible for the majority of drops.
The rate limit is then imposed on the aggregate. If the congested router cannot control
the aggregate itself, it can ask the adjacent upstream router to impose the rate limit
on that aggregate. This upstream rate-limiting is called pushback and can be
recursively propagated until it reaches the routers in the source networks [21]. This
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approach offers a powerful tool to not only combat DDoS attacks but to also
locate and remove network congestion caused by any other reason. However, it
requires significant augmentation ofthe routers on the whole path from the victim to the
sources. A single legacy router on the path complicates the scheme and imposes the
need for secure communication of non-adjacent routers which makes the system
vulnerable to attacks. The approach also requires cooperation of different administrative
domains, which is currently hard to achieve.
In addition, therewas a heuristic anda data-structure (MULTOPS) that network devices
can use to detect DDoS attacks [22]. Each network device maintains a multi-level
tree that monitors certain traffic characteristics and stores data in nodes
corresponding to subnet prefixes at different aggregation levels. The tree expands and
contracts within a fixed memory budget. The attack is detected by abnormal values of
packet ratio, and offending flows are rate-limited. The system is designed so that it
can operate as either a source-end or victim-end DDoS defense system.
Moreover, several systems combat DDoS attacks by using traceback mechanisms to
locate attacking nodes. These systems provide the information about the identity of
attacking machines, but do not themselves stop DDoS attacks. The complexity of
traceback mechanisms is large if the attack is distributed, and they may be susceptible
to attempts by attackers to deceive them. Nonetheless, a good traceback system would
complement the systemvery effectively.
Several filtering mechanisms have been proposed to prevent spoofing of source address
in IP packets [23]. While IP spoofing is not necessary for DDoS attacks, it helps the
attackers to hide the identity of attacking machines so they could reuse them for future
attacks. Eliminating the IP spoofing would complement nicely the proposed system. It
would facilitate easy distinction of normal from attack flows, and reduce greatly the





A system methodology is defined as a collection of procedures, techniques, tools and
documentations aids which will help developers in their effort to implement new system.
A methodology will consist of phases, themselves could also consisting of sub-phases,
which will guide the developers in their choice of techniques that might be appropriate
at each stage of the project and also help them plan, manage, control and evaluate or
validate the system.
Thus, each project will need a methodology as it shows every step taken undergoing
overall phases of research and project work. For this reason, the author decided to apply
a methodology which consists of several phases to accomplish the project right on time.
This model is built and revised to suit the framework of Software Development Life
Cycle (SDLC) and the project itself. This model is the combination of sequential and
iterative approaches of the software development process, which comprises of six main
phases, which are initial planning phase, requirement definition phase, system design
phase, coding and testing phase, implementation phase, and lastly maintenance and
support phase. This will be clearly describes in the Figure 3.1. The details for each
phase will be discussed in the next few sections.
Referring to the methodology that has been chosen, the author had created the project
timeline to ensure that all tasks complete systematically within the timeframe.
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Figure 3.1: Project Framework.
3.1.1 Initial Planning Phase
This phase basically comprises with several sub-phases which are; (1) Project Proposal
Submission. (2) Project Scheduling and (3) Preliminary Research. This phase is very
basic phase that the author needed to accomplish throughout the first semester of final
year, whereby the author has produced the prototype of the system at the end of that
semester. The details ofeach sub-phase are described in the following section.
3.1.1.1 Project Proposal Submission
At the first-half semester of this project duration, the author had submitted proposal for
this project for the purpose of getting the approval from the FYP committee, thus
allowing the author to use the facilities of the University, especially the computer
network facilities available in the computer labs in completing the project.
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3.1.1.2 Project Scheduling
The author has scheduled the project timeline to ensure that the project will be
completed just right in time. However, along the time duration of project completion,
the schedule neededto changefor several time for certain circumstances, wherebythese
included inadequate information and resources for project completion process, changes
in date ofreport submission and project presentation, and others.
3.1.1.3 Preliminary Research
The preliminary research basically involved with the data gathering and data analysis
that relevant with this project. This is also the phase whereby the author does all
necessary research on the previous work of other researchers from various techniques
and aspects, especially in the field ofnetwork security. To ensure that the information is
adequate, relevant and not obsolete to this current of time, the author gather all the
important papers from the network security proceedings held on few years back. Further,
the author has analyzed and segregated collected information as they will aid in system
design and development phase.
3.1.2 Requirement Definition Phase
The purpose of conducting this phase is basically to identify the problems, opportunities
and directives that triggered the project, thus access the risk of pursuing the project.
This phase consists of two major tasks which are defining project scope and defining
project constraints. These will lead the author to list, thus analyze the essential
requirements for this project.
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3.1.2.1 Defining Project Scope
All the project scope should be clearlydefined in order to know from where to start and
finish the project development. It is important because the development or project
progress should not gooutthe scope boundary, which means it may not less or beyond
from the user or system expectations and requirements for the whole project.
For this project, the primary scopes are defined as the project will be implementing a
source router approach and being implemented in Linux router or firewall. Thus,
whenever the system is attempted to be implemented in other platform, it would
requires huge modification, or otherwise the system will r^rforming unexpected or
failure function.
3.1.2.2 Defining Project Constraints
The author needed to clearly identify the project constraints that may disturb some
features ofthe system from operating atoptimum level. Thus, itwill give the significant
indication to the examiners or evaluators, or even the testers of the limitation of the
project, and with that thetesting orevaluation will benot beyond that limitation.
As the name applied, this project will only try to stop the attack from the source
network. Or in the other word is that preventing the nodes in the source network from
engagingwith the cooperationto launchthe DDoSattacksto the victim site.
3.13 System Design Phase
The purpose ofthe design phase is to transform the gathered information from the early
phases into design specification for construction. Inother word, the system design phase
addresses how technology will be applied in the new system developed. Design requires
soliciting ideas and opinions from the users, vendors and ITexperts.
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Moreover, design also requires adherence to internal technical design standards that
ensure completeness, usability, reliability, performance and quality. On the other hand,
design phase is concerned with the technology-based views of the system's data,
processes and interfaces. Design specifications can take many forms including written
documentation or working computer-generatedprototypes of the new system.
For this phase, the major tasks that the author needed to take into consideration were
included designing the architecture of back-end processing for the system and also
designing interfaces for the front-end that will ease end-users and at the same time cater
functional and non-functional specification of the system.
3.1.4 Coding and Testing Phase
Three main tasks have been developed under this phase are:
i. Coding construction - building the system with designed source code.
ii. System testing - test every code and function implemented on the modules
and sub-modules,
iii. System debugging - debug any error that can be found during the testing
period.
The main purpose for those activities is to build and test the system in order to ensure
that every requirement and design specification have been fulfilled very well. The most
important this is conducting tests of both individual system components as well as the




This task is very crucial for the whole system development stages. It would be referring
and integrating all the findings from the early phases in order to assimilate the source
codes for each feature and function for the system as well as to accommodate with all
project requirements on it.
This task involved the writing source codes in C for the back-end processing that need
to be integrated with the Linux libraries, as well as the JAVA for the interfaces or front-
end of the system. This phase also included configuration in customizing the Linux
platform to be served as gateway to the specific source network.
3.1.4.2 System Testing
During this phase, several testing have been done on the DDoS Defense system in order
to ensure that everything is doing fine and has been fulfilled with all the requirements.
This task is considered very important and crucial upon to the system completion. Two
major testing has been conducted which are:
i. Testing during Linux router implementation
For each configuration changed and new configuration added to the
Linux while setting it as the gateway, the testing will be done to
ensure that it performs at least the basic function as the gateway,
means that allow connection for two different networks.
ii. Testing the components ofthe system and as the whole
This involved the testing on integration of front-end and back-end
processing. The interfaces developed should be able to process the
particular function whenever it has been called.
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3.1.4.3 System Debugging
For this particular task, it is all aboutto fix any errorsthat can be found after the testing
has been delivered. Basically, this task really forces programmers to work until they
need to push themselves over the limit. Once an error is identified and detected, the
debugging process shouldbe carriedout in orderto fix the error.
3.1.5 Implementation Phase
This phase includedwith the implementation of the end-product or integratedsystem at
the real platform to prepare the system before the real usage of end-user. Before the
system can be delivered to the end-user, the author developed written documentation as
well as the user manuals to aid the system users. Eventually, the system delivery is take
place, whereby in this phase the author also collecting feedback from the end-users for
the evaluation of the system performance, which later can be used as the guideline for
future enhancement of the system.
3.1.6 Maintenance and Support Phase
This is the final stage of the system development, which is accomplished after the
system has been delivered to the end-users. This will includes the task of configuring
the firewall settings for Linux router customization for the event that the system need to
be implemented in each source network or formatting the hard-disk of Linux PCs
whereby the firewall configuration is needed before the frilly installation of the system
can take place.
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3.2 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENTS
For this project, the following tools will be used in order to develop the project after
serious comparison has been made about the advantages and disadvantages on any
possibleoptionsthat may be available at the current time.
3.2.1 Hardware
i. PC with Linux operating system, with 2.4 kernel version (served as the
gateway), which is having 2 NICs.
ii. PC with Windows XP operating system with standard specification (served
as the client, attacker and victim).
3.2.2 Software
i. Text editor for editing the source codes
ii. GCC version 3.2.2 for the C compiler




This particular project is to come out with defense system against DDoS attacks. For
this matter, the implementation technique has been identified, which is commonly
deployed for DDoS defense system. As for findings; this section will be discussed on
implementation suitable for this project, which is a source router approach that is
implemented in the Linuxrouter. Consequently, the discussion section will be discussed
on the overall designed architecture for this project.
4.1 FINDINGS
As for project, the author has found that the source router approach is suitable for
implementation of this defense system against DDoS attacks. This is based on the
several advantages deploying this kind of method. Further, the simpler and cheaper
configuration of the setting up the Linux router are the key factors that the author
identified to be very ideal that will beused in overall implementation of the project. In
next sub-sections will be discussed for on this matter.
4.1.1 Source Router Approach
The Source Router Approach uses the router (hereafter called the source router),
which serves as a gateway between mesource network containing some of the attack
nodes and the rest of the Internet, todetect and limit DDoS streams long before they
reach the target. There are a few assumptions that take into consideration while
developing this defense system, which are the source network is an edge network, i.e.
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most of the traffic passing through the edge routers either originates within this network
or is destined for some machines in this network.
Further, the source router is assumed to be able to identify the interfaces on which it
receives the source network's incoming and outgoing traffic, either through some
protocol or through manual configuration. In addition, all machines on the source
network use this router as the "exit router" to reach a particular set of destinations. The
source router is thus in a unique position to protect these destinations from denial-of-
service attacks originating at the source network by arbitrating communication
with them.
The source router can detect the attack by observing two-way communication between
machines on the source network and the outside hosts. The source router monitors the
behavior ofeach destination withwhich the source network communicates, looking for
the difficulties in communication, such as reduction of number of response packets
or longer inter-arrival times. These difficulties can be a sign of a denial-of-service
attack against the specific destination or of severe network congestion on the route to
thedestination. These difficulties are detected by periodically comparing theparameter
values of the two-way traffic for each destination against a predefined model of normal
traffic. If the comparison reveals the possibility of DDoS attack, the source router
responds by imposing a rate limit on all outgoing traffic flows for this destination. The
outcome of subsequent observation intervals either confirms or refutes this hypothesis.
Confirmation further restricts the allowed rate limit, whereas refutation leads to a slow
increase of the allowed outgoing traffic rate, according to the degree of well-behavior of
outgoing flows.
The source router detects the attack and responds to it autonomously, without
communication with other routers or human intervention. More accurate attack
detection might be achieved if the source router relied on a signal from the victim
instead of its own incomplete observations. However, this approach requires reliable,
secure and authenticated communication between the victim and the source router,
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which cannot be guaranteed. Also, a more complete observation and more appropriate
responses might be possible if all border routers in the source network were allowed to
exchange information.
4.1.2 Linux Router Implementation
Routers are amongst the most crucial components of the Internet, as each bit of
information on the Internet passes through many routers. Most of the routers used on
the Internet are madeby Cisco. Although these have goodperformance, they come at a
high price. However, the performance of the Linux router makes it an attractive
alternative when concerned with economizing.
The Linux router is easy to handle and configure. It doesnotrequire anyspecial care for
its use other than that required for a normal PC. If there is a problem, configuring it
only takes a few minutes. Moreover, it is basically software on a floppy disk; if the
Linux Router Project (LRP) box gets damaged because of power fluctuations, it can be
simply repaired by instantly convert another available PC into the router by adding
NICs from thecorrupted LRP (if they are notcorrupted) and boot it off the floppy disk.
No configuration will be required forthisrouter at all, except the runtime configuration.
These are the reasons for author on deciding to implement the defense system on the
Linux router, which is then actasthegateway to thedesigned network for theproject.
There are a large variety of hardware and software products available in the open
market as it has the complete structure of the ordinary Linux operating system.
Additionally, having Linux as the operating system on router gives the author the extra
advantage that the author can build packages according to specific needs using shell
scripting.
In addition, the implementation will consist of twoparts:
i The user-level implementation ofthemonitoring andrate-limiting components,
ii The loadable kernel module implementation ofa traffic-policing component.
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4.2 DISCUSSION
The author has designed the architecture of the defense system against DDoS attacks in
such a way that will help the author in completing all of the stages of the system
development. Though the architecture looks simpler, however it took lengthy
procedures to complete the system. As a matter of fact, the system still on its ongoing
process, thus the complete testing cannot be performed yet. The next sub-section will



















Figure 5.1: Architecture of DDoS Defense System
As shown on the figure above, the system will be having of observation, rate- limiting
and traffic-policing components. The traffic-policing component must be part of the
source router, while the observation and rate-limiting components can be partof a self-
contained unit that interacts with the source router to obtain traffic statistics and install
rate-limiting rules.
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Theobservation component monitors all packets passing through the source router and
gathers statistics on two-way communications between the police address set and the
rest of the Internet, recording the flow and connection granularity. This monitoring can
be performed, for example, by sniffing the traffic at the source router interfaces.
Periodically, statistics are compared to models of legitimate traffic, and flows and
connections are classified. Classification results are passed to the rate-limiting
component, which adjusts the rate limit rules.
The traffic-policing component periodically receivesrate-limited flow information from
the rate-limiting component and connection classification information from the
observation component. It uses this information to reach a decision whether to forward
or drop each outgoing packet.
4.2.2 Philosophy
Due to the similarity of attack to legitimate traffic, it is unwise to base any defensive
action on per-packet observations. Therefore, the architecture of the system is designed
in such a way to have an observation of flow and connection behavior and classifies the
complete flow or connection as legitimate or attack. It adjusts its operation dynamically
to match the classifications.
The system detects outgoing DDoS attacks by monitoring two-way traffic between the
source network and the rest of the Internet. The system looks for the following
anomalies in traffic dynamics that may be signs ofa DDoS attack:
• Non-responsive foreign host: Aggressive sending rate coupled with low
response rate. This anomaly pertains only to two-way communications that
follow a request/response paradigm such as TCP, some types of ICMP traffic,
DNS traffic, etc. In these communications, one party sends one or several
packets to the other party, and waits for a reply (either confirmation ofreceipt or
a response) before sending any more packets. For such communications it is
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anomalous to observe an aggressive sending rate coupled with a low response
rate. A low response rate is perceived by the system as an indication that the
foreign host may be overwhelmed by the attack and cannot reply, while an
aggressive sending rate indicates that local hosts are likely participants in the
attack. By detecting non-responsive foreign hosts, the system actually aims to
detect the occurrence of the denial-of-service effect.
• Presence of IP spoofing. The system deploys ingress filtering and discards, at
all times, outgoing packets that do not carry local addresses. In addition, the
system monitors the number of simultaneous connections between the source
network and each foreign host. Those foreign hosts that are engaged in a
suspiciously high number of connections with the victim are declared to be part
of a subnet spoofing attack (where the agent machine spoofs addresses local to
its own subnetwork).
Once the attack has been detected, the system responds by rate-limiting the total
outgoing flow from the source network to the victim, and thus relieves the victim of a
heavy traffic volume. As a liberal response, rate-limiting is chosen instead of filtering.
Since the attack detection may be inaccurate, rate-limiting allows some packets to reach
the victim and possibly correct the future detection. Instead of deploying a fixed rate
limit, the system attempts to determine (guess) the maximum sending rate that the
foreign host can handle.
While imposing a rate limit on total outgoing flow to the victim, this system attempts to
detect those connections within the flow that are likely to be legitimate. Packets
belonging to legitimate connections will be forwarded to their destination regardless of
the rate limit, thus providing good service to legitimate traffic during the attack.
Differentiation of legitimate from attack connections is a very difficult problem in
DDoS defense. The system will be rjerforming the differentiation in two ways:
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1. It monitors connections at all times, and uses legitimate connection models to
detect legitimate connections. Once detected, those connections are recorded in
the Legitimate Connection List. When the attack is detected, packets belonging
to connections from the Legitimate Connection List are deemed legitimate, and
are not subject to rate-limiting.
2. During the attack, the system will uses a set of models to evaluate legitimacy of
packets initiating new connections. Those packets that pass the match are
subject to separate rate-limiting. This technique increases the chances of
successful connection origination during the attack, while limiting the amount of
damage that a stealthy attacker can do (an attacker that can generate packets that
pass the legitimacy test).
In order to detect both attack flows and legitimate connections, the system will uses a
set of legitimate traffic models. In the flow classification case, those flows that clearly
mismatch the corresponding models are deemed attack flows. In the connection
classification case, those connections that clearly match the model are deemed
legitimate.
4.2.3 Overview of the Developed System
This section provides with a brief overview and the screen-shots of the system
interfaces, which is developed to ease in user navigation and give sense of user-friendly
to the system.
As shown in the Figure 5.2 and 5.3, these two are the interfaces captured by the author
when the end-user is first starting the defense application.
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Figure 5.2: The user start the application
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Before the testing on the application could be take place, the user needs to load
predefined network topology to be tested. For this project, the simple network topology
is designed that consist of five machines. Those need to be configured first in
participating in the testing. The machines comprise a PC for attacker, that the attacks
will be originated, a PC serves as client, that attempt to sending legitimate service
through the DDoS-D PC, whereby trie developed defense system been installed. Finally,
a PC to be dedicated as a victim for those attacks. The overall topology described is
shown in Figure 5.4.
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This simple network topology also can be referred to a single DoS attack, since only
one PC is dedicated as attacker (Note that, in order to launch the DDoS attacks, multiple
PCs in different networks are needed). However, in order to reach at the stage that this
system would be able to stop DDoS attacks, a very essential step is to ensure that the
system is able to stop a single DoS attack from one particular attacker machine must be
taken first.
The system will be experiencing several modification and enhancement phases until it
can be tested against complex network topology that might be comprised with multiple
attacker machines in different network node.
In addition, whenthe testing is started, three frames appearto showthe progress of the
testing. There are Scenario frame, Tracking Window frame and Summary frame. The
Scenario frame will be list down the activities of the testing in the timely manner.
Whereas, the Tracking Window will shows the graph of traffics on that particular time
of testing take place. Finally, the Summary frame should summarize the state of the
flow and connection, either bad or good. These are shown in the Figure 5.5. Except, at
the time the authorcapturedthe screen-shot, there was no testingprocessbeing done.
However, due to several limitations that have been identified, thus the complete testing
to the developed defense system still cannot be performed. More explanation regarding
this matter will be explained in the next section.
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Figure 5.5: The interface of scenario frame, tracking window and summary frame.
4.2.4 Limitation of the Developed System
At this current stage, the system is unable to perform packet capturing function, thus the
system is unable to perform comparison between the good and bad traffic (attack vs.
legitimate). The function of capturingthe incomingand outgoingtraffic can be best
implemented if the whole solution working inside of the kernel.
One approach to this is Netfilter tool. Netfilter is a tool for packet interception and
influencing (so called "packet mangling") outside the normal Berkley socket interface.
In programming, hooking is a technique that uses a chain of procedures that act as
hooks to handle an event. When an event occurs, each hook passes the execution to the
next procedure in the chain until it reaches the default one. Netfilter is a set of hooks
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within the Linux kernel's network stack for capturing and manipulating network packets.
The framework allows an administrator to define rules for dealing with network packets.
These rules are grouped into chains, with each chain representing an ordered list of
rules. Chains are grouped into tables, where each table is associated with a kind of
packet processing.
Due to lack of technical knowledge and skills on Linux application development, the
system developed doesn't meet its expected result. Moreover, the required approach
seems to need lots more higher level programming and source codes.
Therefore, more study and research required to overcome those mentioned limitations in





DDoS attacks require the (unintended) collusion of hundreds or thousands of computers
to attack a few victims and defense against DDoS attacks requires the (intended)
cooperation of tens of thousands of ISPs and even consumer networks. The difficulty in
handling DDoS attacks lies exactly in their simplicity. Because they misuse legitimate
protocols and it is extremely difficult to separate attack traffic from legitimate traffic.
By applying that defense system at the point where DDoS traffic enters the network,
perhaps it helps to remove the useless load ofDDoS traffic from the Internet as a whole.
As the primary objective of developing a DDoS defense system in source network, is to
provide good service to a victim's legitimate clients during the attack, thus canceling
the denial-of-service effect. Therefore, the DDoS defense system designed is having
three components that communicate to each other to achieve the desired result. The
components namely are observation, rate-limiting and traffic policing.
The system monitors the behavior of each peer with whom the source network
communicates, looking for signs of communication difficulties, such as a reduction in
the number of response packets or longer inter-arrival times. The system periodically
compares the observed values of the two-way traffic statistics for each peer against a
predefined model of normal traffic. If the comparison reveals the possibility of a DDoS
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attack, the systemresponds by imposing a rate limit on the suspicious outgoing flow for
this peer.
The rate limiting and observation component will always communicating with the
traffic policing component to ensure that the legitimate traffic can be forwarded
unharmed in the presence of attack. However, there should have more study on the
architecture of the system to ensure that it can be successfully deploy at the real
implementation.
5.2 RECOMMENDATION
Several additional and more advanced fiinctionalities can be added as future
enhancement to the expansion and continuation of the defense system developed:
1) Since the system is deployed a source-end based of defense system, which is
strongly detect, limit and thus stop the ongoing attacks from the source network
thus prevent the victim site from been flooded with those attach. It seems like
the system is strongly beneficial to the victim site and less attractive to be
deployed at the source network site. However, this will be advantageous to the
both networks as it can be enhance to have functionalities that would observe,
detect and stop the attacks on both outgoing and incoming packets.
2) The source router approach deployed in this system would be more reliable and
secured if all border routers at the source network are allowed to communicate
and exchange information relating with the updating on the new attack trends
and legitimate connection list, and so forth. Thus, the highly secured defense
system against DDoS can be achieved.
3) More advanced feature is to allow the system to be integrated with other defense
systems that might be performing in different way, in achieving cooperative
with those systems. Thus, the network would be highly secured.
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4) Since the system required a function of packet handling and packet capturing,
therefore, it would be best if the systemis embeddedinsidethe kernel moduleof
the Linux itself. Thus, more in-deptstudiesespecially in technicalknowledge on
Linuxapplication development requiredto enhancethe system.
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